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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This

Tooele,

an appeal from a final Judgment and Order made and

State

Honorable William

Thome,

Judge,

presiding.
The

hull jiiit'ii I lieini) d i iii.il iiiul I IIPM> I or c rippen I HI> I <• Older,

this Court has jurisdiction for the purpose of this appeal pursuant
to § 78-2a 3(2)(i) of the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann
amended).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendant/Appellant, (hereinafter defendant) charges:
1.

that the Court abused its discretion in its division of

the marital properties; and
a.

it failed to properly credit defendant

for his

identifiable pre-marital contributions to the marital properties;
b.

it erroneously imputed income to defendant resulting

in an inequitable alimony obligation.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Regarding findings of fact, the reviewing court views the

evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most
supportive of the trial court's findings and will alter the trial
court's findings only if clearly erroneous. Baker v. Baker 226 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 27, 28.

(Utah, 1993)

To prevail on appeal, defendant

must marshal the evidence that supports the findings and then
demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the findings are "so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous." Baker at 28, quoting
Crouse v. Crouse 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Ut. App.
omitted); accord
2.

Watson.

1991) (citations

837 P.2d at 6.

The reviewing court will alter the trial court's property

division "only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a

2

serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion."

Baker at 28 (quoting Watson v. Watson 837 P.2d 1, 5

(Ut. App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter was tried to the Court, pursuant to Plaintiff's
Petition for Divorce, on January 20, 1994.

Plaintiff was granted

a

divided

divorce.

The

marital

stipulation and evidence.

property

was

pursuant

to

Judgment was entered on the Divorce

action on March 8, 1994.
Defendant moved for a new trial, or in the alternative, for an
Amendment to the Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which was denied on May 3, 1994.

The final

order was signed by the Court on May 17, 1994.
New counsel for defendant/appellant obtained an extension of
time from the Court within which to file a Notice of Appeal, which
was filed on June 23, 1994.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married in 1978. (T.6)

Defendant retired

seven years after the marriage, after having worked at Kennecott
for twenty-five years. (T. 223)

Plaintiff was a homemaker.

Plaintiff filed for Divorce in 1993. The issues at trial centered
around the value and division of the marital estate.
In 1956, defendant purchased a 19.6 acre lot in Grantsville,
Utah, for $2,500.00.

The parties final marital residence would
3

eventually
Grantsville

be built

on part of that

property).

(T. 225)

lot,

(hereinafter,

Defendant

also

the

contributed

$18,000.00 towards the initial construction of the residence,
mostly from funds he had accumulated before the marriage. (T. 226)
At trial, defendant presented evidence that the property had
a current market value of $86,000.00 That figure included a value
for the lot of $9,500.00. (T. 147)

The property was awarded to

defendant.
Defendant had purchased property in Kearns, Utah (hereinafter,
the Kearns property) five years before the marriage.
down payment.
residence.
later

He paid the

This property was initially used as the marital

It was put into joint tenancy after the marriage.

provided

rental

income

during

the

marriage.

It

(T. 229)

Plaintiff was awarded this property.
Defendant had purchased property on Louise Avenue in Salt Lake
City

(hereinafter, the Louise property) two years before the

marriage.

Defendant made a $4,000.00 down payment and paid the

monthly mortgage payments. (T. 232) This property provided rental
income during the marriage. Plaintiff's name was never put on the
title.

Plaintiff was awarded this property.

Defendant was

responsible to satisfy the second mortgage on it, which was taken
to improve the Grantsville property.
In 1993, defendant purchased a quilting machine with proceeds
received from the sale of property that he owned prior to the
marriage. (T. 233)

Plaintiff had been quilting on the machine to

earn extra money. (T. 135) Defendant was awarded the machine, then
4

the Court imputed the average monthly income that plaintiff had
been deriving from use of the machine to defendant's income.

It

found defendant's income to be $1,500.00 per month, which included
$300.00 per month as income from the quilting machine.

The Court

awarded plaintiff $400.00 per month in permanent alimony. (T. 295)
The Court valued the marital estate at $162,107.00, and based
its division on that figure.

(T. 291)

The Court ordered defendant to pay certain debts.

Plaintiff

was awarded the liquid assets. (T. 292-6)
The trial court had before it an amended complaint

for

divorce. Plaintiff's initial complaint had been assigned to Judge
Pat Brian, who had also made findings and entered certain orders
regarding the matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues the Court did not divide the marital estate
equitably. Specifically, defendant argues he should have received
credit for the appreciated value of the land that was associated
with the Grantsville property. Defendant was equitably entitled to
at least an $8,000.00 credit against the value of that property.
Defendant argues he also should have received credit for the
$18,000.00 cash contribution that he made toward the initial
construction of the residence on the property.
Next, defendant argues he should have been awarded the Louise
property, as plaintiff's contributions to that property were fairly
reflected in her share of the equity.
5

Alternatively, defendant

argues he should have, at the very least, received credit for his
pre-marital down payment on that property.
Defendant argues the Court erroneously ordered him to pay
debts associated with the Kearns property that the court had
previously ordered plaintiff to pay, pursuant to a pre-trial order.
Defendant argues the Marcus Knowlden note and the quilting
machine should have both been either included or excluded from the
estate.
Defendant also argues the Court erroneously imputed $300.00
per month in income to his monthly total, based on his being
awarded the quilting machine.

The Court then used this inflated

figure to determine defendant's alimony obligation.
ARGUMENT
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in dividing
up the marital estate and committed clear error in determining the
value of the estate.

It failed to properly credit defendant for

his identifiable pre-marital contributions to the estate.
In

dividing

up

the

marital

estate,

the

over-riding

consideration is that the division be equitable, that the property
be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions
during the marriage, and the circumstances at the time of the
divorce.

Newmeyer v. Newmever 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).

In a divorce proceeding, there is no fixed formula from which
to determine the division of property. Baker v. Baker 226 Ut. Adv.

6

Rep. 27, 28 (Utah App. 1993).
The trial court sought to equalize the division of the estate.
The court found the marital estate, less debts, to be valued at
$162,107.00. (T. 291) (Findings of Fact, para. 15)

This included

a finding that the Grantsville property had a current fair market
value of $86,000.00. (T. 291) (Findings of Fact, para. 6, 15) The
appraiser, Mr. Alsop, testified that the $86,000.00 figure included
a determination that the value of the lot was $9,500.00. (T. 147)
Defendant contends that at least eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00)
of the $9,500.00 value of the lot should have been deducted from
the value of the property because he had originally purchased the
lot long before the marriage and was entitled to credit for any
appreciation of the value of the lot. The lot was originally more
than nineteen (19.6) unimproved acres. (T. 225)

The marital

residence and appurtenance was built on three acres. (See Order on
Plaintiff's Motion, dated January 5, 1994, where Judge Brian
recognized the three acre plot (Addendum A) (para. 3, 4, 5, 7)) A
correct

calculation

would

have

credited

defendant

appreciated value of at least 16 unimproved acres.

with

the

The value of

the residence and appurtenance and three acres should have been
used as the value of the marital property, not the entire lot. Mr.
Alsop

placed the current value of each acre at about $500.00.

(T. 149)

The value of the marital property land was $1,500.00.

Utah case law recognized that identifiable pre-marital assets
are generally exempt from the marital estate.
Preston 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982).
7

See Preston v.

(Each party should receive pre-

marital assets)•

In Burke v. Burke 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987),

the court noted that pre-marital property, gifts, and inheritance,
may

be

viewed

as

separate

property

and

in

appropriate

circumstances, equity will require that each party retain the
separate property brought into the marriage (citing Preston at
706).

The court listed some of the factors generally considered:

the amount and kind of property; whether the property was acquired
before or during the marriage; and the source of the property. Of
particular concern is whether one spouse has made any contribution
toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse
(citing Dubois v. Dubois 504 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1991), and whether the
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the
parties.

In Burke, the court awarded one party his pre-marital

property

and

the

other

party

did

not

get

credit

for

the

appreciation of that property.
In Mortensen v. Mortensen 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), it
was noted that according to the Supreme Court, trial courts should
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage, or property acquired in exchange
thereof,

to

that

spouse,

together

with

any

appreciation

of

enhancement of its value, unless: 1) the other spouse has by his or
her

efforts

or

experience

contributed

to

the

enhancement,

maintenance, or projection of that property, thereby acquiring an
equitable interest in it, or 2) the property has been consumed or
its identity lost through commingling or exchange or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift or an interest therein to the
8

other spouse. (Also see Willev v. Willev 866 P.2d at 555 (Ut. App.
1993); Bingham v. Bingham 872 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Ut. App. 1994).
As noted in Newmever. the appropriate treatment of property
brought into a marriage by one party may vary from case to case. In
Newmever. plaintiff's inheritance, acquired during the marriage,
was properly excluded from valuation of the marital estate (citing
Jesperson

v.

Jesperson

610 P.2d

326, 328

(Utah

1980) (not

unreasonable for trial court to withdraw from marital property the
equivalent of assets brought into marriage). 745 P.2d at 1278 (Utah
1987).
Here, the court found that defendant paid $2,500.00 for the
lot in 1956.

The lot was, and stayed in defendant's name and

remained unimproved until the construction on the residence began
in 1981.
evidence

(Findings, para. 6)
regarding

the

The court adopted defendant's

$86,000.00

fair market

value

of

the

property, which necessarily included the $9,500.00 value for all
the land.

Defendant asked for the full credit but equity would

dictate that defendant be credited with at least the appreciated
value of the portion of the lot that remained unimproved.

There

was no evidence presented that plaintiff contributed anything to
the unimproved land.

She did nothing to enhance its value.

The

unimproved land is separable and identifiable and should not merge
into the marital estate.

The house and the three acre plot on

which it sits is the actual marital property in which plaintiff had
an interest.

Judge Brian had already recognized that.

A, para. 3, 4, 5, 7)
9

(Addendum

Defendant submits the court should have credited him with a
pre-marital

asset

worth

at

least

$8,000.00

to

reflect

the

appreciation of his original pre-marital investment in the lot.
The court erred in not deducting that, or any, amount from the
$86,000.00 figure.

It should have calculated the property to be

valued at no more than $78,000.00.
Plaintiff suggested the proposed valuation of the property be
set at $86,813.00 (T. 185), based on a cost approach analysis that
had the property worth over $96,000.00. (T. 270)

Plaintiff

suggested crediting defendant with $9,500.00 for the lot value and
deducting it from the higher figure. (T. 185)

The court rejected

plaintiff's cost approach analysis and accepted defendant's fair
market value figure, but then failed to credit defendant for the
value of the unimproved lot.
Regarding the applicable factors listed in Burke (supra) and
Mortensen. (supra). with respect to the kind of asset in question,
defendant bought an unimproved lot long before the marriage that
appreciated through no effort or contribution by the plaintiff.
The plot of land actually used for the house and yard has its own
separable value of $1,500.00. That's the only "land" plaintiff had
any interest in.
Defendant submits it is inequitable and abuse of discretion
for

the court

to have

failed

to credit

him

fully

for his

identifiable pre-marital asset, only a small portion of which was
commingled

with

the house and yard

residence.

There was no evidence from which to conclude that the
10

to make up

the marital

entire lot had merged into the marital property.

A value had been

placed on the small, separable part that was commingled.
Brian's order, by implication,

means that defendant

Judge

was not

restricted from the 16 acres outside the marital property.

This

means the court did not consider that acreage part of the marital
estate as far as plaintiff's interests were concerned.
The trial court wrongfully found that all the defendant's premarital interest and investments were commingled with plaintiff's
"sweat equity." (T. 291- 2)

The court only alluded to giving

defendant "some credit for original down payments and other things
on property," (T. 293) (Findings, para. 17), but made no other
specific finding on the matter. Defendant contends the court erred
in those findings due to insufficient evidence.
have

identified,

separated,

and

credited

The court should

defendant

for

his

appreciated pre-marital asset, the nature of which (unimproved lot)
has remained the same throughout.
Defendant contends that the court erred in finding that his
other identifiable pre-marital monetary contributions that were
used to initiate construction of the marital residence had
commingled with plaintiff's sweat equity, thus losing its separate
identity.

(T. 291-2) (Findings, para. 6)

In 1981, defendant withdrew $7,000.00 from his sick leave and
vacation benefits, the vast majority of which he had accumulated
prior to the marriage, and spent it on the initial construction of
the marital residence.

(T. 83; 228) The parties had been married

three years when work on the house began.
11

In 1985, when he

retired, defendant withdrew $12,000.00 of the $15,000.00 he was
entitled

to

from

construction.

his

(T. 84)

retirement

fund

and

spent

it

on

the

Defendant asked the court for credit of

those pre-marital funds against the value of the property.
The court heard testimony that the parties worked together to
build the house. Both parties contributed time and labor. (T. 11;
81-3)

Defendant submits that equity would dictate that the court

do what was done in Newmever (supra).

In Newmeyer

(supra) the

court credited the plaintiff with the identifiable amounts of money
she had put into the marital home, then awarded the defendant onehalf of the equity of the home.

745 P.2d at 1279.

Since both

parties contributed time and effort, both should be entitled to
half the equity of the home. But since defendant also contributed
substantial sums of money, the majority of which were pre-marital
in nature, separate and identifiable, he was entitled to credit for
those monetary

contributions, apart

from

the value

that the

parties1 combined efforts entitled them to share.
The

court

erred

in

finding

that

defendant's

monetary

contributions, as well as his labor and efforts, had merged with
plaintiff's labor and efforts.

The court wrongly found that

defendant's money had lost its separate identity. If defendant had
not put those funds toward the house, plaintiff would not otherwise
have been entitled to benefit from all that money.

She may have

been entitled to half of that which was accumulated by defendant
during the marriage, less than one-third.

The vast majority of

those funds were clearly pre-marital in origin.
12

The court, based

on erroneous findings, abused its discretion in failing to credit
defendant for his separate pre-marital monetary contribution.
The court

abused

its discretion

property to the plaintiff.

in awarding

the Louise

Alternatively, the court abused its

discretion in failing to give defendant

full credit

for his

identifiable pre-marital monetary contributions to that property.
This failing caused the court to err in the valuation of the
property and the estate.
Defendant purchased the property two years prior to the
marriage (T.232); (Findings, para 13). He made a $4,000.00 down
payment and two years of mortgage payments of $129.00 per month.
The property remained in defendant's name and was a source of
rental income.

(T. 30, 74, 232-3) (Findings, para. 13). In 1991,

a second mortgage was taken against it to finance improvements on
the Grantsville property.

(T. 233)

Plaintiff testified she thought the equity in the property
prior to the second mortgage being taken against it was $7,000.00 $8,000.00.

(T. 28)

Defendant

testified

the

property

was

basically

self-

sufficient, that no other marital monies or resources were expended
in its upkeep, including the two mortgage obligations; and that any
expenditures incurred were more than set off by the profit realized
from it, and that it was currently realizing no profit.
232-3)

Plaintiff did not dispute that evidence.

(T. 74;

(T. 197,8)

Plaintiff testified that they'd repainted the house, installed some
new windows, used carpeting, and new kitchen cabinets.
13

(T. 169)

Plaintiff did not testify to expending marital funds to do this.
In fact, plaintiff

corroborated

the defendant

by

saying

property had produced income before the second mortgage.
that, it broke even.

the

After

(T.197) There was insufficient evidence to

support the findings that marital money was ever used to pay the
mortgage or improve the premises.
found.

(Findings para. 13)

Nevertheless, the court so

The reasonable conclusion from that

evidence would be that the rental income paid the mortgage and was
used to purchase materials to improve the premises.

Defendant

testified the rent produced $200.00 per month in income before the
second mortgage (T. 74)

While it is arguable that the rental

income merged with other marital funds, this situation is still
distinguishable.

Sharing in the proceeds from a property is

different than sharing the ownership and title to that property.
Simply because plaintiff shared in the rental income does not
necessarily entitle her to an
ownership interest in the source of that income.

The court erred

in its findings, which were based on insufficient evidence.
Defendant made no gift of this property to plaintiff like he
did with the Kearns property.

The trial court found defendant's

gift of joint tenancy to plaintiff on the Kearns property an
important factor.

(Findings, para. 12)

This property was in a

different posture. This property cost plaintiff nothing.
the

marriage

nothing.

It

was

never

a

marital

It cost

residence.

Plaintiff's contributions to it would have been fairly reflected by
her receipt of half the equity.

(See Newmever supra)
14

Defendant

intended to keep this property in the family. He was renting it to
his son and his family for minimal rent because the family's wages
were so meager.

(T. 252)

Under these circumstances, equity

dictates that defendant should have been awarded the property.
Plaintiff deserved a one-half interest in the equity, which by her
own accounting was $4,000.00.

The court abused its discretion in

awarding this property to plaintiff.

Its findings were not

supported by the evidence.
Alternatively, if awarding the property to plaintiff was
equitable, then the court abused its discretion in not crediting
defendant for his identifiable pre-marital monetary contribution to
the property.

Equity should dictate that, since no separate

marital funds were used to maintain the property, and since both
parties enjoyed any income from it and both contributed "sweat
equity" through time and effort toward it, defendant's additional
contribution of $7,000.00 ($4,000.00 down payment and $3,000.00 in
payments) of his pre-marital monies should have first been deducted
from the value of the property.

Because defendant lost the

property, and the property continues to increase in value and
generate income for plaintiff, equity should require that defendant
at least get his pre-marital money back. Those funds are separable
and identifiable.

(Newmever.

supra)

The court erred in finding

those funds just blended into the marital estate. (Findings, para.
13)

No separate marital funds went into that property.

findings were not supported by the evidence.

15

The

The court found the Louise property value to be $30,000.00.
Defendant

was

obligation.

ordered

to pay

the

$8,245.00

second

mortgage

(T. 293) Had defendant received his proper credit for

his pre-marital contributions, the property should have been valued
at $23,000.00.

At the very least, defendant should have gotten

full credit for his down payment.
The court also ordered defendant to pay the same property
taxes and fire insurance on the Kearns property (Findings, para.
16) that Judge Brian had previously ordered plaintiff to pay when
he gave her the benefit of the Kearns rental income.
para. 3) (Addendum B)

Plaintiff did not pay them.

(See Order,
(T. 185) Her

counsel incorrectly argued that there was no order in place
regarding those obligations.

(T. 315)

The court found that

plaintiff was still receiving the Kearns rental income.

(T. 308)

There was no explanation given for this contrary order. Judge
Brian issued a valid order that plaintiff did not comply with.
Just because it was a pre-trial order did nothing to diminish its
validity.

The court erred in transferring that obligation to

defendant without any findings to support it, and with no finding
that

Judge Brian's order was somehow invalid

contempt excusable.
compliance.

or plaintiff's

Plaintiff received a windfall from her non-

Those amounts should be deducted from the defendant's

debt obligation.
The court erred in including the value of the Marcus Knowlden
note as part of the marital estate, or alternatively, in failing to

16

credit defendant with the value of the quilting machine against the
value of the estate.
Shortly after the marriage, defendant sold some property that
he had owned prior to the marriage. He sold it to Marcus Knowlden
for $30,000.00.

He took a $20,000.00 mortgage and assigned

plaintiff a $10,000.00 promissory note.

(T. 243)

Mr. Knowlden paid off the mortgage with a lump sum payment a
month before plaintiff filed for divorce. (T. 243) Defendant used
that money to purchase the quilting machine.
The court awarded defendant the quilting machine in spite of
finding that plaintiff was actually using it to make quilts.
(Findings, para. 19)

Apparently, the court did not consider the

machine a marital asset due to its pre-marital sources. Since the
court presumably found the machine was a pre-marital asset and
excludable from the estate, it should follow that plaintiff's note,
also of pre-marital origin, should have been excluded from the
estate.

It was plaintiff's gift all along.

The evidence showed that plaintiff was receiving the monthly
payment on the note.

(T. 182)

Indeed, it was listed as a source

of income for plaintiff.
Alternatively,

if the note was properly included in the

estate, then defendant's machine should have been included.
In other words, the court erred in not crediting each party's
assets which derived from the same pre-marital source against the
estate, or it erred in not excluding both from the value of the
estate.
17

Had defendant been properly credited for all his identifiable,
separable pre-marital monetary contributions, the value of the
marital estate would have been less than that which the court
found.

The distribution would have been more equitable, with

plaintiff still having received no less than she properly,
equitable deserved, but certainly no more, as was the result here
due to the court's errors.

ALIMONY
The

Court

abused

its discretion

in

imputing

income

to

Defendant and erred in determining his Alimony obligation.
Generally, alimony is to be awarded after consideration of
three factors:

a) the receiving spouse's financial condition and

needs; b) the receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income;
c) the providing spouse's ability to provide support. Newmever v.
Newmever 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987).
Failure
discretion.

to consider

these

factors

constitutes

abuse of

Hill v. Hill 869 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App., 1994)

The trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on
each factor to enable the reviewing court to ensure the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon
[those] factors.

Willev v. Willev 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App.

1993).
Defendant contends the court failed to adequately consider his
ability

to provide that much

support.

The court

calculated defendant's monthly income to be $1,200.00.
18

correctly
(T. 295)

It then imputed an additional $300.00 per month to his monthly
income because he was being awarded the quilting machine. (T. 295)
The $300.00 per month represented plaintiff's earning ability from
her use of the machine.

(T. 296)

The court awarded the quilting machine to defendant. Evidence
was presented that defendant had purchased the machine in March,
1993, with money that he derived from the sale of a pre-marital
asset. (T. 243)
Plaintiff had testified that she was a skilled quilt maker.
(T. 155)

She had her own equipment (a quilting serger and an

electronic Bernina sewing machine), which she used to sew the
fabric together before quilting it on the quilting machine.

She

testified that her average monthly income from making quilts was
$300.00, although some months she earned "hardly anything." (T.157)
Defendant had never quilted, nor ever used the quilting
machine.

There was no evidence that he could even sew.

He asked

that he be awarded the machine because he felt it was his since he
bought it with pre-marital funds. When asked if he intended to use
the quilting machine, he responded that "...it looks like I'm going
to have to have income from some source." (T.244)
In its findings, the court concluded that defendant
"...has the ability to earn an additional $300.00 by
virtue of the fact that he is being awarded the quilting
machine, which he requested, and which should be awarded
to him. Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00
per month from the use of that machine and has been
earning that sum... . The plaintiff will no longer have
that money available to her, but defendant Knowlden
should have that money available to him to add to his
monthly net income."
(see Findings of Fact, para. 19)
19

The court went on to find that it ".•.questions whether defendant
Knowlden will in fact make use of the quilting machine... ."
(T. 296); (Findings, para. 19)
At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, as
defendant's trial counsel argued the error of that ruling, the
court responded that:
"I seem to remember Mr. Knowlden indicating that he would make
the same, same income from it."

(T. 306)

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by imputing
$300.00 more to his monthly income, bringing his total to $1,500.00
per month. The court then calculated the disparity in the parties'
incomes using the $1,500.00 figure, and awarded plaintiff $400.00
per month in permanent alimony.

(T. 296); (Findings, para. 19)

In Willey v. Willey, supra, defendant claimed the trial court
improperly

imputed

his income in setting

the alimony

award.

Defendant argued that the court's findings were based solely upon
speculation.
discretion.

The appellate court agreed and

found abuse of

The appellate court stated that the trial court has

authority to impute income to defendant; however, it cannot be
premised on conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise
assessment requiring detailed findings.
Defendant

886 P.2d at 544.

contends the court engaged

in speculation and

conjecture in determining that he had the requisite skill and
ability to equal plaintiff's income from quilting.

There was no

evidence, nor any findings, that defendant had or could reasonably
acquire any skill or experience in quilting.
20

Secondly, he did not

have the other machines needed,

nor the required

preparing the material for the quilting machine.

skill

for

There was no

evidence, nor any findings, that he could even use any of the
machines.

There was no evidence, nor any findings, that he had a

source or any contracts or contacts for selling his quilts. There
was no basis for the court's apparent assumption that defendant's
output and product quality would be the same as plaintiff's had
been, and that his quilts would command a similar price. The court
assumed that defendant's purported income from quilting would be
steady.

Plaintiff testified that it was sporadic at best.

There exists no rational basis, in fact, to conclude that
defendant could earn even one penny making quilts, much less
$300.00 per month, every month.

It's not simply a matter of

feeding cloth into the machine and having it spit out a quilt.
Just because plaintiff could use the machine to create a home-made
product that people would buy does not mean defendant could do so
as well. Defendant did not say that "he would make the same income
from it" as the court seemed to remember.

Defendant never stated

he could use the machine to earn anything.

His response was

ambiguous at best.
The court did not engage in a careful and precise assessment
of defendant's ability to provide that support, nor were its
findings detailed to reflect such an assessment.

It speculated

that defendant could match plaintiff's skill and ability to quilt
and earn the same amount of money. Unfortunately, the court could
not award defendant the requisite skill and ability.
21

The machine

is, in fact, useless to defendant and he can realize no monthly
income from it.
The court abused its discretion in this matter.

It should

have used the $1,200.00 figure in determining defendant's real
income.

Presumably, the disparity in incomes would not have been

as great, and the alimony award should have been reduced or
eliminated accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendant prays that this Court
reverse the findings of the trial court and remand the matter back
to that court to amend the distribution of property to reflect the
proper credits due the defendant.

Defendant prays the alimony

award be reduced or eliminated.

DATED this 2 3

day of /Ld&<**J^~~~

Respectfully submitted,
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1994.
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ATTACHMENTS

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. 934300096

Defendants.
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant,
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being
present in person and being represented by counsel, J. Duke
Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and
having presented

exhibits and evidence, and the court having

reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and'heard the arguments of
counsel, and based thereon, the court now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff is now and has been for a period or more

months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this
action a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah.
2.

That the parties Joyce Knowlden and Grant R. Knowlden are

husband and wife, having been married on September 10, 1978, in
Elko County, Nevada.
3.

That the Defendant, Grace Poloskey is a resident of

Tooele County, State of Utah, and the sister of the Defendant,
Grant R. Knowlden.
4.

That irreconcilable differences have arisen between the

Plaintiff and the Defendant Knowlden which make continuation of the
marriage impossible.
5.

That

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

Knowlden

have

had

no

children born as issue of this marriage and none are expected.
6.

Real property located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway,

Grantsville, Utah, was acquired by Defendant Knowlden prior to the
marriage.

Defendant Knowlden paid $2,500.00 for the land in,

approximately, 1956, and the land remained undeveloped until the
parties commenced building upon the property.
2,

Plaintiff and

Defendant Knowlden commenced building on tlie property and improving
the property on or about 1981, and by their labor and "sweat
equity," built the residence located at that property, which is
valued at $86,000.00, the current fair market value. The funds of
money that Defendant Knowlden claims as premarital and which were
used to assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence
became co-mingled with marital funds and any monies that may have
been separate property of Defendant Knowlden lost its separate
identify because of that co-mingling.

Further, the residence was

constructed with the individual efforts and "sweat equity" of the
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden.

This Grantsville property was

enhanced and augmented by the acts of the Plaintiff and its entire
value became a marital asset.
7.

That on or about May

Knowlden transferred

13, 1991, Defendant Grant R.

the Grantsville

property to his sister,

Defendant Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration.

Since that

time, the Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have continued to reside
in the property and treated the property as their own, though the
property remained in the name of Defendant Knowlden's sister,
Defendant

Poloskey.

Defendant

Poloskey

paid

the

taxes

and

insurance at various times subsequent to the transfer, but was
reimbursed

those sums by monthly

3.

payments made by Defendant

located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to
his sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey.
11.

For purposes of dividing the marital estate, the current

value of the Grantsville property should be used rather than the
value of the property at the date of its transfer on or about May
13, 1991, as prayed for by Defendant Knowlden.
12.

The Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided together

subsequent to their marriage at a home located at 4801 South 4900
West, Kearns, Utah.

That property was purchased by Defendant

Knowlden prior to the marriage, and in, approximately 1973, but
transferred into the names of Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden
subsequent to the parties' marriage. The transfer of said property
into joint tenancy constituted a gift of the premarital property to
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden.

Further, during the marriage,

Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided at that residence, made
payments on the mortgage and made improvements on the property,
including repainting and carpeting.
premarital

asset with marital

Co-mingling occurred of this

funds.

Further there

was

enhancement of the property by the acts of the Plaintiff.
property is a marital asset.
date

of

trial, is

an
The

The value of that property, at the

$42,000.00, based

stipulation of the parties.

5

upon

the

appraisal

and

13.

Prior to the marriage and in i976, Defendant Knowlden

purchased a property located at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
marriage.

That property

remained

in his name during the

During the marriage, the mortgage was paid.

Further,

during the marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden put siding
and new carpeting on the property as well as thermal windows and a
new roof.

Further, the marriage, Plaintiff assisted in scraping

and repainting the property, cleaning the property for the rentals,
making curtains for the property and managing the property for
rentals. The property is a marital asset for purposes of assessing
the marital estate and dividing the same due to the acquisition of
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and
enhancement of the property by Plaintiff and the co-mingling of the
marital funds with the property.

The property is valued at

$30,000.00, pursuant to the evidence presented at trial and the
testimony of the Plaintiff.
14.

The court finds that the power tools have a value of

$3,500.00. Plaintiff testified that the power tools and equipment
were valued at $7,385.00, but that testimony was based an amount
that was provided to her by another individual which sum she did
not think was correct and to which she added some things in order
to come up with that value. Defendant Knowlden valued the tools at

6

approximately

$3,500.00

and

the

court 'finds

that

value

more

convincing.
15.

The Plaintiff and Defendant's marital assets, less debts,

are valued at $162,107.00, and as follows:
PROPERTY/ASSET

VALUE
$86,000.00
$42,000.00
$30,000.00
$1,325.00
$800.00
$200.00
$975.00
$100.00
$100.00
$7,576.00
$1,000.00

Grantsville property
Kearns property
Louise property
Chevrolet Celebrity
Ford truck
Ford mustang
Oldsmobile Firenza
Chevrolet Citation
Chevrolet Cavalier
Marcus Knowlden note receivable
Farm equipment
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account,
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre
Power Tools and tools

$1,224.00
$3,500.00

The above-referenced values are based upon the testimony of the
parties, stipulation of the parties, appraisals or other evidence
adduced at trial.
a.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the Kearns property,

the Firenza, the Cavalier, the Citation, the Marcus Knowlden note,
the Key Bank Account, Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Credit
Union and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre.

The total of the marital

estate thus initially awarded to Plaintiff is valued at $51,975.00.
16.

Defendant Knowlden

should be awarded

the

Grantsville

property, the Celebrity, the Ford truck, the mustang, the power
7

equipment
Knowlden

and tools
should

pay

and

farm

equipment.

the

following

Further, Defendant

debts:

as set

forth

on

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, and as follows: Levitz $546.00, Bank One
$437.00, property taxes (Kearns property $297.00), fire insurance
(Kearns property 179.00), Utah State taxes $103, and the debt to
Shellie Eyre $113, which total $1,693.00.
17.

An

equal

division

of

the

marital

estate

requires

Plaintiff to receive, approximately, $81,000.00. To equalize the
estate, Plaintiff should be awarded the Louise property valued at
$30,000.00, less the first mortgage.

The first mortgage owing to

Lomas Mortgage should be paid by the Plaintiff and the second
mortgage owing to Lomas Mortgage should be paid by Defendant
Knowlden.

That division is based upon the representations of

Defendant Knowlden that the second mortgage

is approximately

$8,245.00, with a monthly payment of $249.72 and that the first
mortgage is approximately $3,086.00, with a monthly payment of
$97.00.

The total award to Plaintiff of marital property is

approximately $79,000.00, which is approximately one-half of the
estate and provides Defendant Knowlden some credit for the original
down payment made on the Grantsville property.
18.

It is reasonable that the building materials located at

the Grantsville property be sold and that Defendant Knowlden insure
that those be sold and that Defendant Knowlden obtain two estimates
8 ,

from two different appraisers as to what'they think the property
can sell for and sell the building materials to the highest bidder.
The money received should then be divided equally between the
parties, one-half to each.
19.
income

of

Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is retired and has total net
$1,200.00, which

includes

social

security

and

his

Kennecott Retirement income, less the deduction for the survivor
benefit which he pays each month for the benefit of the Plaintiff.
In addition, Defendant Knowlden

has

the ability

to

earn an

additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he is being awarded
the quilting machine, which he requested and which should be
awarded to him.

Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00

per month from the use of that machine and has been earning that
sum during the pendency of this action.

The Plaintiff will no

longer have that money available to her, but Defendant Knowlden
should have that money available to him to add to his monthly net
income. The Plaintiff's monthly income is comprised of $120.00 per
month which she receives from Defendant Knowlden7s son, Marcus
Knowlden, which is a note receivable owed to her.

Further, with

the award of the Louise property to her, Plaintiff will receive the
sum of approximately $325.00 per month, for a total net income of
$445.00 per month.

Based upon the respective incomes of the

parties, it is reasonable that Defendant Knowlden pay Plaintiff
9,

permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month.
not equalize the parties' income.

That sum does

The court questions whether

Defendant Knowlden will, in fact, make use of the quilting machine
and it is anticipated that in the near future, Plaintiff will
qualify for social security benefits.

Four hundred dollars per

month is reasonable based upon Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay
and the Plaintiff's needs.

The Plaintiff's monthly expenses are

minimally $879.00 per month, without a mortgage or rent payment.
The Plaintiff will have $448.00 net per month and the Kearns
property which will provide her with a place to live, rent free.
The $400.00 is within Defendant Knowlden's . ability to pay and,
clearly, the Plaintiff needs that amount in order to survive.
20.

Defendant Grace Poloskey testified that she is holding

approximately $7,000.00, representing fire insurance proceeds paid
to her as the title holder to the Grantsville property.

The court

does not have authority to re-claim those assets as Defendant
Poloskey had a contract with the insurance company and the court
does not have authority to retrieve those sums.
21.

That the personal property acquired by the parties should

be divided according to Exhibit 10, attached hereto, designated as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, expect for the
disputed items set forth on Exhibit 10b, which should be divided as
follows:
10-

ADDENDUM A
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A-

on

FILED SY.
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3 4->
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, ? , O
310 South Main Streer
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah S4i01
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
IN RE: CONTEMPT

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. '934300096

Defendants.

Judge Pat B. Brian

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly for
hearing before the above entitled court on December 14, 1993, at
the hour of 11:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District
Court Judge presiding, on Plaintiff's Motion in Re: Contempt, and
the Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by
counsel,

Terry

R.

Spencer

for

Kellie

F.

Williams,

and

the

Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present and being represented
by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having heard the proffers
of counsel regarding the issues presented, and the court having

0002.0

reviswec the i: Les ana pleadings; an-J Lor good cause appear ir.Ci.
there!oro:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The previously ordered payment of rental income from the

Kearns rental and previously ordered alimony shall be paid by
Defendant Grant R. Knowlden to Plaintiff on or before 5:00 p.m. on
the 10th day of. each month.
2.

The rental income payment and alimony for December 1993

will be paid by December 15, 1993.
3.

From the date of this order until February 1, 1994,

defendant Grant R. Knowlden is permitted to enter that portion of
tjjusi approximately twenty-acre property which contains the marital
residence (a portion of approximately three acres) for the specific
purpose

of

completing

or

assisting

in

the

completion

of

a

firewall."
4.

During each of Defendant's visits to the three-acre

portion of the property from the date of this order until February
1, 1994, Defendant is ordered not to in any way enter the living
quarters of the marital residence.
5.

After February 1, 1994, Defendant is ordered not to enter

that approximately three-acre portion of property surrounding the
marital residence for any reason.

If the

"firewall" is not

completed by February 1, 1994, Plaintiff is permitted to obtain the
2

00020;:*

thira
irant

now: a en

\H

p a r c v r e compi.etc
:..-.

tne

be r m a n c i a . . . i 7 resp•.:

co tnis third party should the services oi a third party De
obtained.
6.

Defendant is further ordered not to harass or threaten

Plaintiff in any way,
~,

in addition 1:0 Defendant's access to the approximately

three acres of property

surrounding the marital residence as

described above, Plaintiff is ordered to permit Defendant access to
his tools contained in the list provided in Exhibit "A,! to this
order at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 1993,
8.

The Tooele County Sheriff's office, or other appropriate

law enforcement agency, is hereby ordered to assist in the transfer
of tools at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 1993.
DATED this

£> ~

day of

^

{$•?<> ~/> *r,-*f£4<&1

PAT B. BRIAN
District Court Judge
iS TO FORM:

EM!TMITSUNAGA
Counsel for defer

Dated:

1^1 >3

000208

ADDENDUM B

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. 934300096

Defendants.

Judge Pat B. Brian

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly

for

hearing before the above entitled court on May 11, 1993, at the
hour of 10:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District
Court Judge presiding, and the Plaintiff being present in person
and being represented

by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the

Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being
represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having met
with the parties in chambers, and the parties having reached a
leement as to the majority of the issues, and the
court having recommended approval of the same, and entered its own

ULILlNl o [ j : !

order as to some issues, and based thereon and for good cause
appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff, Joyce Knowlden, shall remain in the temporary

use and temporary possession of that certain real property known as
6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, until further
order of this court.
2.

The $2,600.00 (Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollar) insurance

check recently received by the parties shall be endorsed by the
parties and shall be used to pay the outstanding debts to Sears,
Dr. Adamson, and Garfield Credit Union.

The balance remaining, of

approximately $300.00 (Three Hundred Dollars) should be paid to
ISAT on the debt for the therapy provided to Plaintiff.

It is

acknowledged that the debt to Garfield Credit Union is to pay off
the balance owing on the Plaintiff's vehicle.

If the court finds

bhat there is some unequal benefit to the Plaintiff by payment of
:hat debt, at the time of trial, then the payment of the debt may
>e considered in the allocation of assets.
3.

The

Defendant

is ordered

to continue

to manage

the

arties' two rental properties known as 4801 South 4900 West,
earns, Utah, and 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
ay the mortgages thereon.

On a temporary basis, Defendant is

warded the right to receive the rental proceeds from the Louise
2

Avenue property and pay all taxes and insurance thereon.

On a

temporary basis, the Plaintiff is awarded the right to receive the
proceeds from the rental property at 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns,
Utah, subject to her paying the water bill, taxes and insurance
thereon.
4.

The Defendant is hereby enjoined and restrained from

coming around the Plaintiff at the marital residence at 6000 North
Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, or purposely coming in
contact with the Plaintiff or from telephoning or having any
contact whatsoever with Plaintiff. Further, Defendant is enjoined
from harassing, annoying, or physical touching or abusing the
Plaintiff.
5.

The Plaintiff is hereby awarded the temporary use and

possession of the personal property at the marital residence,
including the quilting machine.

The Defendant's rights to the

future use or possession of that machine should not be prejudiced
by the temporary possession being awarded to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
shall have the right to receive any and all proceeds from the sale
of quilts and from the use of that machine.
6.

The Plaintiff

is ordered

to inventory

the personal

property located at the marital residence and to provide the
Defendant with a list of that property and a list of those items of
personal property which she wishes awarded to her.
3

Defendant is

